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CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION:
SOCIAL MOVEMENT IMPACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS*1
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Korea University
The end of long‐standing authoritarianism in the late twentieth century
provoked a global resurgence of civil society in the Third World that has driven
scholars increasingly to ask how revitalized social movements impact democratic
progress. Despite daunting theoretical and methodological problems in studying
movement outcomes, and disparate historical and social conditions producing
diverse, contending views of movement effects, this article confirms that
institutionalization of movements is a major, though not sole, mechanism for
consolidating and advancing democracy. It provides an institutional route to
influence state policy‐making and allows movement groups to forge political
alliances with reformist power elites within polity. Movement institutionalization
requires a particular melding of movement organization characteristics and
favorable political opportunities that vary widely by time and context. It
promotes democracy as long as the social movement organization maintains its
identity and autonomy vis‐à‐vis state power, the state is open, and democratic
parties enjoy influence within government. This article ascertains the assets and
liabilities of previous research on the causal relationship between social
movements and political democratization and suggests possibilities for future
research, but acknowledges that great theoretical, methodological, and empirical
challenges remain.
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INTRODUCTION
The sudden mid‐1970s collapse of authoritarianism in Southern
Europe, including Spain and Portugal, ushered in unprecedented
opportunities that emancipated citizens from authoritarian repression
and unleashed rapid political democratization. The wave of
democratization washed beyond Southern Europe to engulf most Third
World societies in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and even former East
European Soviet‐satellite countries. The astounding scope and rapidity
of contemporary democratization’s growth led Harvard political
scientist Samuel Huntington (1991) to dub it a “global resurgence of
the third‐wave democratization” and ignited wide scholarly inquiry
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into political democratizationʹs origins, processes, and consequences.
Among the many theoretical perspectives developed, one stands out.
A group of prominent political scientists, initially skeptical about the
sustainability and consolidation of the resurgent democracy and wary
of reversion to authoritarianism perhaps through another military
coup, collaborated to investigate in historical, comparative terms the
modalities of democratization, to identify the main negotiators of
power transfer from incumbent despotic leaders to democratic
advocates, and to consider the prospects for further democratic
consolidation.1 A utilitarian game‐theoretical approach that prioritizes
the strategic calculations of both government and opposition political
leaders in the peaceful transition from authoritarianism to electoral
(thus limited) political democracy heavily imbued their work.
Academics with such sophisticated utilitarian theories of democratic
transition and consolidation are often called “transitologists” and
“consolidologists.”
This elite‐centered, strategic pact‐making, game‐theoretical stance,
despite its tremendous contributions and influence, is criticized by a
variety of scholars with competing theoretical and methodological
views (Edles, 1995; Kitschelt, 1993; Yashar, 1999). One of the most
frequent detractions faults game theory’s view of the role of civil
society. Game theory considers civil society “ephemeral”: Civil society
resurges only after democratization expands political opportunities. It
thus is a result, not cause, of political liberalization and tends to be
short‐lived with limited political leverage in the course of regime
transfer and democratic consolidation. This low estimation of the
impact of civil society is widely refuted by scholars based on their
in‐depth comparative, historical studies. Nevertheless, such revived
analytic focus on civil society’s (in particular, a variety of social
movements including labor)2 contributions to “social” and “political”
democratization the former being “civil society democratization,”―
1 Their joint efforts produced a mid‐1980s four‐volume, immediate “classic” for
students of contemporary political democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986;
O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c).
2 Obviously, the conceptual boundaries of civil society are much broader than those
of social movements. In addition to social movements, interest groups and
non‐governmental organizations and their networks constitute civil society (Choi, 2005).
Yet as the focus of analysis lies in the roles of social movement organizations in
political democratization in this paper, the terms civil society and social movements are
used here interchangeably.
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the latter “state democratization” itself lacks analytic rigor, marred―
by methodological difficulties, causal vagueness, and thus theoretical
ineptitude.3
This paper provides a more elaborate explanatory framework that
addresses these problems. It examines the role of civil society from
three angles: the kinds of causal impacts of civil society (with a
particular focus on those of social movements); civil society
organizational features (including tactics/strategies, organizational
structure and leadership, collective action repertoires, and relationships
with other agents of democratization); and the historical, domestic, and
international circumstances that favor civil society. This study’s
theoretical contributions yield a more balanced though not―
definitive understanding of democratization by exploring not only―
power from “above” but also power from “below” and clarify the
relatively under‐explored theoretical question of how social movements
lead to political as well as social transformation.4
COMBINED STRATEGY OF POLITICAL PROTEST AND
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION
Beyond Corporatism
The conventional and most influential theoretical paradigm that
relates the role of civil society to state democratic policy‐making is
“neo‐corporatism,” pioneered by Schmitter (1979, 1983). It contends
that corporatist mechanisms are necessary to convey civil society
demands to decision‐making forums and to negotiate sustainable
democratic development. In other words, democratic consolidation
requires that interests find corporate, institutional expression that
3 As scientifically and systematically illuminating the causal relationship between
social movements and social transformation is deeply problematic, it is relatively
under‐explored and in need of theoretical and methodological innovation. This is ironic
given that researchers are usually drawn to social movement study based on the tacit
assumption that social movements are an important variable for social transformation
(Giugni, 1999).
4 Davis (1994) finds the causal and analytic link claimed between social movements
and democratic institutionalization unconvincing and cites the need to examine the
context in and process by which political mobilization fosters democratization. In the
same vein, Haber (1996) and Encarnación (2001) argue that civil society impacts depend
on a specific institutional and political setting and that the power of civil society to
shape democracy is subordinate to and circumscribed by that of political institutions.
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incorporates them in decision‐making. More forcefully, Przeworski
(1991, 1995) argues that dual transformation economic liberalization―
and political democratization with minimal popular defection or―
disruption requires that labor submit to the hegemony and leadership
of conservatives in the matter of political democratization and of the
bourgeoisie in economic reform which he calls “concertation.”―
Corporatism (a la Schmitter) and concertation (Przeworski) both stress
the need for centralized, strong, and capable peak organizations for
successful collection, articulation, and representation of interests.5
Though these paradigms have some power and feasibility, they raise
serious empirical and theoretical questions. Encarnación (1996)
contends that centralized organizational structure is a result of
concertation in democratizing societies, but a cause in established
democracy. Further, the impact of organizational structure on
concertation is contingent because concertation flourishes without
centralized labor as in Spain and flounders with it as in― ― ―
Argentina. Social movement professionalization and bureaucratization
runs the risk that civil society will be manipulated by corporate
intermediators that serve political parties or the state or be directly
incorporated into them (Diamond, 1999). The result is what Michels
(1962) calls the “iron law of oligarchy,” which saps civil society
autonomy and social and political power. That is, once assimilated,
activists are co‐opted, protest goals are preempted, and civil society
atrophies (Piven and Cloward, 1977; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens, 1992; Selznick, 1966).
Negative outcomes of institutionalization on movements are by no
means rare. When Western capitalist systems developed neo‐corporatist
social regulations to overcome the crisis in the regime of accumulation
in the early 20th century, labor movements participated in a “tripartite
commission” that transformed them into an important political
foundation and representative for left‐wing parties. Such
institutionalization made them a political force alongside the state and
capital, but diminished their focus on social transformation that served
collective labor or advanced democracy. Relations between
rank‐and‐file labor and bureaucratized left‐wing labor movement
leadership grew estranged, factions emerged, flaws arose in internal
democracy, and movement political objectives grew more limited, such
5 Some advocates of these views emphasize evidence that civil society promotes
political democratization when movement activists and progressive intellectuals join the
government, as in South Africaʹs “radical reform” (Adler and Webster, 1995).
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as material gains for labor movement members alone.6 Ultimately,
institutionalization of labor movements prompted “new social
movements” to form particularly in the early 1960s demanding― ―
expanded participatory opportunities and proposing diverse
alternatives.
In more theoretical terms, social movements require ongoing
collective power that is, the ability to mobilize collective action― ―
to effectively confront power elites (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). A
certain degree of autonomy and independence is indispensable for
social movement organizations to maintain their resource base and
collective action capability. If they win popular recognition as
legitimate and potent representatives of their cause and determine that
such success requires increased bureaucratic and hierarchical
organization including becoming part of institutionalized politics― ―
to manage enhanced resources, they risk losing sight of original
demands. They may reformulate goals to suit what their new
organizational structure and the existing political system can
accommodate and are thus subject to co‐optation by their counterparts,
having lost their raison d’être (Piven and Cloward, 1977). From this
perspective, institutionalization constrains and distracts social
movements from achieving social transformation. It greatly undermines
their ability to mobilize popular collective action and support as their
goals narrow to a self‐centered focus and they lose their ability to
confront the status quo they have newly joined.
Toward a “Dualistic” Strategy
The strategies civil society movements use to intervene in politics
are, however, much more diverse than the literature implies.
Institutionalization of social movements does not always entail
movement demise via co‐optation. More recently many scholars have
supplemented discussion of confrontational and disruptive tactics with
the institutional and participatory repertoires of collective action,
indicating this boosts civil society’s overall leverage (Collier, 1999;
Goldstone, 2004; Guidry, 2003; Webster and Adler, 2000). Collier’s
(1999) historical comparative analysis of democratization finds that “in”
status groups often play a “mobilization game,” and “out” groups a
6 Feminist movements experienced the same demise when they aligned with labor
unions and entered the institutionalized political arena, as the latter championed
chauvinistic ideologies (Hanagan, 1998).
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“participation game.” To participate in the negotiations indispensable
to democratic transition and consolidation, collective action must
assume some form of institutionalization (Garretón, 1989).7 Offe (1990)
thus concludes that examining the conditions under which social
movements maintain a non‐institutional and confrontational political
logic is more interesting than their institutionalization if the potential
benefits of political institutionalization are considered.
The finding that social movement organizations often pursue political
participation as well as popular mobilization deviates from the
conventional understanding of their innate nature. The pervasive
concept defines them as groups of densely tied people who share a
solid collective identity they maintain outside institutional politics and
who use sustained collective action to contend against state political
authority in pursuit of clearly articulated goals that stand to benefit
not only movement participants but the public at large (Gamson, 1990;
Tilly, 1978, 1994). This implies that if collective actors, having achieved
some measure of legitimacy through collective action that confronts
and disrupts their counterparts, then establish institutionalized
channels to further engage with power elites through peaceful
negotiation and compromise, they no longer are social movements but
political interest groups.
However, recent in‐depth historical comparative studies of civil
society impacts on democratizing government reveal a more complex
and multifaceted relationship between social movements and the state,
suggesting conventional definitions of social movements are too
narrow (Collier, 1999; Giugni and Passy, 1998; Goldstone, 2004;
Guidry, 2003; Hanagan, 1998; Webster and Adler, 2000). Goldstone
(2004: 336) argues, “There is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary
between institutionalized and non‐institutionalized politics .... Social
movement activity is not so much an alternative to institutionalized
politics, diminishing as the latter increases; rather it is a
complementary mode of political action, which increases even as
democratic politics spread.” Goldstone (2004: 344) continues, “The
notion that there are ‘in’ groups and ‘out’ groups, and that the latter
7 According to Giugni and Passy (1998), social movements gradually institutionalize,
that is, join the political power structure, in three stages: first, consultation with the
state or parties articulates movement information or opinion as well as policy
recommendations; second, integration gives movements some responsibility for policy
implementation; and third, delegation empowers movements with a degree of
responsibility in policy‐making and policy‐implementation.
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engage in protests while the former engage in politics, is a caricature
with little relation to reality.”
It is also overly simplistic to contend that only in societies that have
consolidated democracy can civil movement proliferation enhance
democratization, while in the Third World, where democratic transition
and consolidation are tenuous, the state is unable to survive, let alone
accommodate, the various, conflicting demands, confrontation, and
intransigence different social groups press (Bresser Periera et al., 1993).
In other words, a dichotomized analysis in which social movements ―
institutionalized or not are perceived to be effective for established―
democracies but counter‐productive for democracies in transition or
consolidation is inadequate. Both the impact of institutionalization on
movements and the state’s capacity at different stages of democracy to
productively engage with movements in their various forms are more
complex than many suggest.
Conceptual distinction between social movements and interest group
politics remains useful, but the mode of interaction between social
movements and the state is far from uniform conflictive and/or―
cooperative, depending on time, place, and issue amounting to what―
Giugni and Passy (1998) term “conflictual cooperation.”8 The
complementary operation of these strategies resolves empirical findings
that are problematic when definitions of social movements are too
constricted. Such flexibility enhances social movements’ overall political
leverage in democratizing civil society and the state (Goldstone, 2004).
Finessing a delicate balance between the two strategies, a “dualistic
strategy” (Cohen and Arato, 1992), is necessary, given that civil society
may lose influence and legitimacy if it appears rigidly partisan,
factional, and intent on egoistical gains at public expense, in which
case political democratization suffers (Webster and Adler, 2000). In
other words, keeping one foot in the polity, the other in civil society,
best allows social movement groups to both productively influence the
state in policy‐deliberation, ‐making, and ‐implementation, and assure
civil society vitality with minimal possible encumbrance of a
movement decline through co‐optation (Giugni and Passy, 1998).
Movement institutionalization clearly can advance democracy in at
least one respect. Political parties in an established political system are
more resilient and resource abundant than social movement
8 As Hanagan (1998) shows, the relationship between social movements with political
parties has historically oscillated between disengagement and integration.
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organizations. By entering or forming institutions, social movements
are more on a par with parties and the state. As “democratic
institutions,” they can realize their political objectives and achieve
social reform through regularized political channels that reduce the
risk of marginalization and enhance legitimacy (Giugni and Passy,
1998; Hanagan, 1998; Kubik, 1998). Institutionalization can assist
achieving movement objectives in procedural, substantive, and political
terms. Such institutionalization may take one of two forms: first, as in
South American feminist movements, social movements may press for
and achieve institutionalized entrance that allows them to pursue
“bottom‐up” demands in state policy‐making; second, in a “top‐down”
process, the state may invite and enable movement participation ―
that is, institutionalization to resolve emerging social problems―
concerning which it lacks information or knowledge.9
CONDITIONS PROMOTING MOVEMENT INSTITUTIONALIZATION
WITHOUT CO‐OPTATION
Social Movement Institutionalization
Given that social movements pursue political agenda or engage with
political actors, which means interacting with political institutions ―
parties and the state what conditions compel social movement―
institutionalization and, if it occurs, how can co‐optation and
preemption by state power elites be avoided? The social movement
literature has highlighted the risk of co‐optation when social movement
activists and organizations are incorporated into the state or otherwise
institutionalized, but rarely addresses how to elude co‐optation yet
remain integrated or constructively engaged. Moreover, understanding
of what causes movement institutionalization is incomplete because
analysis often makes unfounded teleological and determinist
assumptions. Tarrow’s (1994) famous theorization on movement
trajectories suggests that social movements move from an oppositional
protest posture to one increasingly bureaucratic and institutional that
allows them to negotiate with or become part of the political
establishment. Similarly, Offe (1990) discerns three sequential
movement developmental stages “takeoff,” followed by―
9 The state in South America used this strategy when it integrated homosexuals in
decisions on how to deal with AIDs proliferation (Giugni and Passy, 1998).
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“stagnation,” and ultimately, “institutionalization.” Contending that
people join social movements and collective action based on rational
calculation that the benefits of protest exceed costs, Przeworski (1991)
avers that they rationally choose to shift strategies once protest secures
them opportunities to engage with the state through institutional
means that better assure routine political access and influence. At that
point, in his view, participants decide that radical collective street
action is less beneficial than inclusion in established state processes ―
or as his dictum states, they believe they must choose “to participate
or to perish.”
Yet if we agree that social movements are not fixed entities but a
process that frequently entails both continual confrontation and
collaboration with power‐holders (Melucci, 1989; Tilly, 1994), then
movement institutionalization can be understood as one possible
outcome of that process. If the two sides discover they have competing
but often reconcilable interests, or even shared ones, they may decide
they are best pursued through institutionalized processes. This carries
several crucial implications. First, movement institutionalization
requires both that movement actors decide to join the state apparatus
and that power elites elect to incorporate them and positively respond
to demands (Dryzek, 1996; Giugni, 1998; Giugni and Passy, 1998).
Diverse factors limit and facilitate their respective decisions. Second, to
proactively respond to social movement demands the state must
possess a modicum of capacity and propensity (McAdam, 1996; Tilly,
1994). It is only inclined to encourage such civil society
institutionalization if, based on movement vitality, it considers it
politically necessary to avoid disruption of the democratic process.
Otherwise, the state will be inclined to dismiss movements as trivial
and irrelevant distractions.
This necessity of a match between state capacity and civil society
vitality for movement institutionalization to occur and promote
democratization indicates a corollary power imbalances do arise,―
with negative implications for both institutionalization and
democratization (Oxhorn, 1995). Moreover, any benefit from civil
society movement institutionalization and integration accrues only if
each has relative autonomy from the other. This ensures state capacity
and inclination to engage and movements’ continued viability and
ability to avoid co‐optation. Although this requires blending
independence with dependence, what emerges is a mutually
reinforcing relationship between the state and civil society, an
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interdependence that optimizes the process of democratization (Kwon,
2004). Still, the stateʹs capacity and inclination to productively engage
with civil society fundamentally determines whether the latter will
advance, distract from, or be irrelevant to state democratization; that is,
civil society’s impacts are contingent (Giugni, 1998; Tilly, 1994).
External Conditions: Political Opportunity Structures
Generally speaking, exogenous conditions influence social movement
outcomes including institutionalization more than endogenous― ―
ones, such as the necessary but not alone sufficient ability to maintain
collective power (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1994). For social movements to
be institutionalized, external conditions political opportunity―
structures that allow demands to be transformed into substantive―
policy alternatives and promoted within the political process must
exist. Two variables largely determine political opportunity structure ―
the nature of the state structure and distinctive character of political
parties (Hipsher, 1998b). In Brazil, an open state and democratic
parties proved essential for social movements to advance democracy.
Chile’s closed state structure and absence of democratic political forces
effectively foreclosed opportunities for positive civic movement
contributions (Hipsher, 1998b). In sum, expanded political opportunity
structure is a critical intervening variable that mediates whether social
movements will assume an institutionalized form that allows them to
advance democracy.10
While an open state and democratic parties are structural aspects of
movements’ political opportunity structure, adequate understanding of
the creation and character of political alliances requires a more
contextual account of that structure that recognizes the interactive
dynamics involved. History demonstrates that social movements’
independent capacity to effect macro social transformation, including
democratization, is often lacking or limited and requires strategic
10 However, as the preceding discussion of interdependence intimates, the
relationship between political opportunity structure and movements institutionalized―
or not is not unilateral, the former dictating the role of the latter; a reverse process―
also holds. Collective action, with or without movement institutionalization, may
pressure existing political forces to pursue further political reform. Moreover,
institutionalization itself expands movements’ political clout by consolidating political
collaboration among reformist political groups and providing more favorable conditions
including enhanced power, repertoires, and legitimacy to pursue political objectives― ―
(Tarrow, 1998).
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alliance with reformist political forces (Diamond, 1999). For example,
collaboration with the Democratic Party proved critical for the
American feminist movement to advance its agenda. As the Democratic
Party included feminist movements in its advisory board processes and
platform, the movements used the party political institution to
publicize and legitimate their efforts and engineer success (Tarrow,
1994). The need for reformist alliances is critical, given that,
historically, social movements that lack them or form other types of
institutional alliances frequently deteriorate. For example, political and
strategic alliance between traditional left‐wing and right‐wing political
forces, one of several possible permutations, may relegate social
movements that manage to enter the institutionalized political arena to
political irrelevance, as such forces may favor the certainty of the
status quo, which they dominate and from which they benefit.
Alliances among or with existing non‐reformist political forces tend to
alienate and marginalize social movements politically and dilute their
identity, particularly during economic crises (Offe, 1987).
Differing historical and political conditions create diverse possibilities
for social movements to forge alliances with existing reformist political
forces. Opportunities are relatively high when liberal democracy is
vibrant and left‐wing parties enjoy a solid position within the political
system, as in Western liberal democracies. However, in Western
Europe, the developing crisis in the social democratic welfare state
since the late 20th century has led some left‐wing parties to seek to
become a popular, “catch‐all party.” This has attenuated their
traditional foundation of labor class support, and pushed them to seek
new alliances with and support from the new middle class, the carriers
of new social movements. This history illustrates that shifting historical
and political circumstances change what institutionalized alliances will
prove most beneficial to advancing democracy, as Germany
particularly illustrates.11
The historical background for Third World movement
institutionalization differs from Western Europe. Unlike in revolutions,
authoritarian collapse followed by transition to democracy does not
summarily remove conventional dictatorial political forces. Strong
authoritarian forces that remain during the transition toward
democracy can either impede coalition between civic movement forces
11 One of the structural conditions for the strategic change cited above is relative
economic prosperity (Offe, 1987).
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in support of radical participatory democracy and liberals in the
political system or, conversely, facilitate movement institutionalization
(Mainwaring and Viola, 1984). Most Third World countries in
democratic transition were devastated by dictatorship. They
experienced intermittent militant anti‐dictatorship struggles until
frustration reached critical mass and social movements erupted and
relentlessly demanded and forced immediate change and gradual
retreat of authoritarian power. As democratic transition ensued,
collective and militant popular mobilization gave way to voluntary
resolution of diverse conflicts of interests through mediation and
democratic procedures and rules. The raw experience of dictatorship
and remnants of conventional authoritarian forces were compelling
reminders to movements of the need to develop democratic means of
resolving diverse interests (Hipsher, 1998a). Should they fail,
authoritarian or dictatorial forces could use popular dissatisfaction or
the political vacuum to return to power by force or by capitalizing on
popular disenchantment (Mainwaring and Viola, 1984). Indeed, even if
such regression is substantially impossible, social movement forces
tend to fear the possibility and become wary of sustained mobilization
of collective action that might abet it (Kubik, 1998). This leads them to
restrain the confrontational collective action that initiated reform and
opt for more institutionalized modes of social movements (J.
Valenzuela, 1989).
State character and the status of reformist forces within the state
constitute the political environment that directly influences the
prospects and procedures for social movement institutionalization
(Giugni and Passy, 1998). First, in terms of state character, strong,
“overdeveloped” states and states that respond to challenges by
exclusionary strategies are less conducive to movement
institutionalization than weak states and ones more inclusive.
Centralized power structure and organized institutions for
administrative management makes strong states more effective in
policy formulation and implementation and less reliant on the
assistance of other institutions or groups than weak states. They
exclude social movement organizations, as they do not consider them
trustworthy and legitimate allies and representatives of popular
demands and opinion.
Second, with regard to the political status of reformist forces, in
order for social movement organizations and reformist groups to forge
successful policy‐oriented alliance, social movement forces must be
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incorporated into an existing political system within which reformist
political forces already enjoy legitimacy and a measure of power. In
addition, movement forces and reformist power elites must maintain
mutual cohesion lest exposure to counter‐attack by former power elites
dilute their power (Offe, 1987; Sandoval, 1998). Movement
institutionalization is particularly productive and viable when
progressive groups with whom they ally dominate the political scene
and welcome alliance.
Internal Conditions: Social Movement Organizations
While exogenous variables critically impact movement
institutionalization and effectiveness, endogenous variables are also
important. Several internal social movement attributes facilitate
movement institutionalization (Giugni and Passy, 1998). First, when
social movements present challenges that do not directly impugn the
existing political authority, their legitimacy and concerns are more
readily accepted by it, which expedites institutionalization. For
example, if environmental movements stress the ravages of
environmental destruction and the public benefits of prevention
without implicating political power elites, they and their concerns are
more likely to be welcomed in decision‐making become―
institutionalized than had they presented those challenges as an―
indictment of the standing political system. When political power elites
sense threat, movement suppression rather than induction into the
institutional corridors is probable. Second, social movements with
formal, professional, centralized, and bureaucratic structure are more
readily institutionalized than those without. Such organizational
attributes assist prompt resolution of disagreement within a movement
according to designated procedures. Moreover, once movements so
structured are institutionalized, they are adept at political compromise
and negotiations, because they are able to generate consensus on what
demands to present and do so in an effective and efficient hierarchical
manner. Third, when movements have professional or specialized
knowledge that the state needs in policy formulation, the state is more
likely to draw them into the political arena.
For social movements to maintain collective power while
participating in the established system, they must safeguard their
organizational identity and autonomy, their original source of collective
power (Cardoso, 1992; Sandoval, 1998). Institutionalization and
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independence may appear antithetical, but can prove complementary.
In particular, Third World states in the transition and consolidation
democratization stages present a political climate in which social
movements with adequate organizational identity and autonomy can
maintain independence even as institutionalized participants, as their
continued fight against the vestiges of authoritarianism makes them
coequal with oppositional parties with whom they can ally (Dryzek,
1996; Sandoval, 1998). The loss of autonomy forfeits the opportunity to
contribute to the advancement of democracy by abetting political
compliance with and subordinate status to the “powers that be.”12
Dryzek (1996) adds an additional requirement for movement
institutionalization to benefit political democratization: assimilation of
movement demands with state imperatives. He argues that every
society has an endemic state imperative such as “accumulation”―
(securing continuous capitalist development) or “legitimation” (keeping
social and political order) subject to change in different temporal―
environments. If movement demands are not compatible with the
binding state imperative, politically institutionalized movement groups
receive only symbolic rewards that lead to co‐optation, as occurred
with environmental movement groups in the Clinton administration.
Dryzek (1996: 480) contends, “To the extent that public policy remains
under the sway of state imperatives, groups whose inclusion coincides
with no imperative will not easily acquire the tangible goods they
value. They may be allowed to participate in the policy‐making
process, but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them” in
which case, their legitimacy, integrity, and survival require them to opt
for exclusion and continuing collective confrontation rather than
political inclusion.
12 In this respect, Törnquist’s (1998: 130) distinction between “integration” and
“incorporation” is apt: “One may distinguish historically between the integration of
people into politics on the basis of relatively autonomous broad popular movements
generated by comprehensive economic development (like in many parts of Western
Europe), and the elitist incorporation of people with less solid organizations of their own
into comparatively advanced polities in economically late developing societies (like in
the Balkans and many third world countries)” (emphasis added). Social movement
organizations that are politically institutionalized must be integrated, not incorporated,
to advance state democratization.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION 187
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIZATION UNENDING DIALOGUE―
BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE
The sweeping wave of democratization from the mid‐1970s has
generated tremendous Third World transformation at the national and
global levels. Consequences encompass resurrection of long‐suppressed
civil society, democratization of tyrannical political systems, and
formation of a “global civil society” network that links and solidifies
civil society organizations across national borders (O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986). Although democratization will unlikely be derailed by
a return to authoritarianism, it has progressed in a more faltering
fashion with more conspicuous inter‐societal variance in tempo and
quality than anticipated. Moreover, civil society in post‐authoritarian
countries has not invariably advanced democratization. It can fracture
into groups pursuing diverse, perhaps conflicting collective interests ―
with or without mutual coordination through ongoing, even violent,―
challenges to the state, which stands to reinstate repression in the
political vacuum before democratization has taken hold and set
democratic rule back. Even if nascent democratization manages a
certain level of civil cohesion and peace, civil society’s positive impact
on political democratization on institutional and procedural―
rule‐making is often limited by inopportune domestic structures and―
international environments, social movement organizations’
strategic/tactical incompetence, and so forth (Encarnación, 2001; Huber,
Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, 1997; Payne, 1991). This leads us to ask
what post‐transition circumstances help rejuvenate a civil society able
to contribute to state democratization an inquiry inadequately―
pursued due to unresolved complex conceptual, causal, theoretical, and
methodological issues.
Although civil society vigor increases as revitalized popular protest
both instigates and results from the retreat of authoritarianism and
beginning of democratic transition, democratization is integrative ―
rather than unilateral as game‐theorists propose shaped both by―
popular demand from below as well as by negotiations among power
elites from above (Collier, 1999). Moreover, if we think of
democratization as having two main aspects civil society and the―
state it is essentially an ongoing, intimate, and complex relational―
outcome of interaction between the two, both conflictive and
cooperative. This fluctuating interaction between the two dimensions of
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democratization implies, first, the relation between the two is not
always zero‐sum but can be positive‐ or negative‐sum (Ekiert, 1991;
Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; Oxhorn, 1995); second, successful
democratization of one often bears on that of the other; and third, for
democratization to advance, both the strength and civility of society
and the state’s democratic policy‐making capacity and propensity must
increase.
The conceptual boundaries of democratization are huge, embracing
multiple sub‐dimensions including political, institutional, social, and―
cultural areas. Possible civil society impacts on democratization are
also multidimensional, and may alter the political system, shape
institutional rules and procedures, foster civic norms, and inculcate
democratic culture. Civil society’s reach, however, does not encompass
all aspects of democratization, or, at least, other forces influence
democratization as well. Democratization’s essential
multi‐dimensionality suggests the potential mutual conflict among
diverse arenas of democratization (Brysk, 1994). For instance, “overly
successful” civil society democratization can impede state
democratization. Similarly, when state democratization excludes or
limits popular participation in democratic rule‐making, it restricts civil
society democratization (Oxhorn, 1995). The same potential conflict
among different arenas of democratization can equally obtain in the
relationship between different phases or types of democracy. Thus, if
we follow Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens’s (1997) categorization
of three successive stages of democratic development from formal to
participatory to social democracy, conditions that promote formal
democracy do not always advance social democracy.13
Based on these theoretical premises, this paper seeks to clarify the
causal impact of civil society on state democratization, which has not
been clearly elaborated in the extant literature (Brysk, 1994; Haber,
1996; Oxhorn, 1995). The vast multidimensionality of democratization
and limit to civil society influences on it imply that civil society’s
causal impact on political democratization is contingent not a―
necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for political democratization,
which sometimes advances without a robust civil society (Davis, 1994;
Goldstone, 2004; Karl, 1990; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens,
13 The contemporary emphasis in political democratization on individual rights and
an autonomous market for economic reform tends to abet socioeconomic inequality, a
serious impediment to subsequent social democracy, which demands minimal
socioeconomic gaps in an egalitarian society (Törnquist, 1998).
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1992; Schmitter, 1997; Tilly, 1995, 2000). To borrow Tilly’s (1995)
metaphor, democracy is a lake at the juncture of multiple small
streams, some of them springing from civil society and others not.
Therefore, no fixed, universal set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for democratization exists. The causal effect of certain factors on
democratization is contingent, that is, contextual they occur only in―
the presence of certain other factors, times, and locations. By extension,
this means multiple factors other than civil society and interactions
among them must be accounted for when evaluating causal impacts of
civil society (Tilly, 2000).
Among several characteristics of civil society that can influence its
impact on political democratization, this article focuses on its
institutionalization or lack thereof. Institutionalization is not inevitable
in the course of social movement trajectories (Przeworski, 1991;
Tarrow, 1994). It occurs only when both social movement leaders and
members jointly seek to enter the institutional political arena and
political elites stand ready to accept them. This conception of
movement institutionalization reflects the understanding that social
movements are not defined as a fixed entity but in relation to
counterparts with potentially contending interests or identities socially
and historically constructed, not structurally derived (Melucci, 1989;
Tilly, 1994). Historical legacies, domestic structures, and international
environments constrain the mutual arrangements the two sides make,
in a process not unlike what Karl (1990) terms “structured
contingency.” External structural conditions delimit choice.
The emphasis on institutionalization as a salient vehicle for civil
society to impact political democratization reflects the recent
re‐conceptualization of the nature of social movements. Their power
and viability do not require an “outsider” status and contentious
collective action mobilization vis‐à‐vis the political structure (Tarrow,
1994; Tilly, 1994). Social movements may navigate the amorphous,
permeable boundary between non‐institutional and institutional politics
to achieve goals through both compromise and confrontation with
polity members (Goldstone, 2004). Institutionalized engagement with
the state being a player in the political structure can possibly put― ―
social movement organizations at risk of co‐optation or preemption by
policy‐makers and eventual irrelevance. To maintain the integrity and
autonomy necessary to promote political democratization, social
movements must strategically balance movement politics (as
“outsiders”) and institutional politics (as “insiders”). Such a balance
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derives in part from social movement organization activists’ facile
leadership and power elites’ genuine concern for inclusion versus
co‐optation. However, both sides may also recognize the benefits each
can accrue when civil society is vigorous and autonomous. A vital,
engaged civil society can increase the state’s capacity and propensity
for political democratization, help social movements convey popular
concerns from below in a non‐threatening manner, bring special
expertise into the policy‐making arena, and convey and build popular
support for the state and movements.
Although the importance of movement institutionalization and its
potential contribution to political democratization have often been
noted, engendering conditions have not been fully scrutinized, which
requires in‐depth, systematic, and historical‐comparative research.
Given that movement institutionalization derives from choices of civil
society and the state, contingent upon external structures, we need,
first, to bring both synchronic and diachronic perspectives to the
historical backgrounds, external conditions, and international influences
that provide the context for strategic calculations as to whether to
participate (movements) and to incorporate (the state) (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). Second, since the two sides that
deliberate regarding movement institutionalization base choices on
perceptions of likely benefit/loss, of the availability of political
opportunities, of the impact of their counterparts’ likely judgment, and
so forth, we must consider their subjective interpretive frameworks ―
“cognitive structures” if we are to understand why they reach―
certain conclusions and actions (Bermeo, 1997; Edles, 1995; Kitschelt,
1993; Suh, 2001, 2004). This requires drawing on the wisdom of the
constructionist, “framing” perspective in analysis of movement
institutionalization (Cress and Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and
Benford, 1988, 1992).
This article indicates why previous studies of political
democratization and the role of civil society in it have lacked
explanatory power, but does not purport to offer solutions. Most
premises it offers are highly hypothetical and require extensive
empirical, historical, and comparative scrutiny to ascertain their
theoretical validity and reliability. The explanatory framework
elaborated here may lead future research on civil society and
democratization in more promising directions if systematically
conducted.
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